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iAbstract
This paper presents an analysis of the dramatic diﬀerence in wage growth
rates between smokers and non-smokers. Since the net diﬀerence in wage
growth rates between smokers and non-smokers remains substantial even af-
ter controlling for various factors, the question is whether smoking is a proxy
for individual discount rates or learning ability since both these sources of
unobserved heterogeneity can account for this wage growth gap. We present
a fairly parsimonious theory of career choice and derive a model implication
that discriminates between the discounting and learning hypotheses. The
empirical evidence using data from the National Longitudinal Surveys of
Youth suggests that smoking is a proxy for individual discount rates.
Key words: Wage dynamics, Unobserved heterogeniety, Discount rates, Learn-
ing ability
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ii1 Introduction
Smokers in the U.S. earn substantially less than non-smokers. For example, Levine et. al.
(1997), using the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY), ﬁnd that smokers earn
11% and 17% less than non-smokers in 1984 and 1991, respectively. After controlling for a
host of individual and family characteristics, this wage gap reduces to 4.2% and 6.9%. In
a recent study using the same NLSY data (Munasinghe and Sicherman 2005), we ﬁnd that
the major source of this wage gap is the dramatic diﬀerences in wage growth rates between
smokers and non-smokers. Over a period of about ten years non-smokers experience, on av-
erage, wage growth rates that are about 60% greater than those of non-smokers. Controlling
for an extraordinarily rich set of explanatory variables for wage growth, including schooling
and test scores, this diﬀerence is reduced substantially, but the wage growth gap between
non-smokers and smokers remains large (around 20%) and signiﬁcant. This paper attempts
to ﬁnd an explanation for this observation.
W h i l ei ti sp o s s i b l et h a ts o m eo ft h en e td i ﬀerence in the wage growth gap between
s m o k e r sa n dn o n - s m o k e r si sd u et od i r e c te ﬀects (e.g., health), it is more likely that these
diﬀerences are due to other unobserved or unobservable factors that are jointly correlated
with smoking and wage growth. The two obvious sources of unobserved heterogeneity among
individuals are learning ability and time preference. First, although information on produc-
tivity related characteristics is widespread — from intelligence test scores to detailed schooling
information — various other dimensions of productivity and learning ability, including drive,
motivation, discipline, focus, charisma and communication skills among others, are unob-
servable to the econometrician. Second, diﬀerences in individual time preference are also
inherently unobservable.
The crux of the issue is that unobserved variations in either learning ability or time
preference can account for the wage growth gap between smokers and non-smokers. First,
if individuals diﬀer in their learning ability then eﬃcient (able) learners are likely to invest
more in schooling as well as in other forms of human capital, including job training. As a
consequence, eﬃcient learners will have a higher ﬁr s tw a g ea n das t e e p e rw a g ep r o ﬁle. If
eﬃcient learners are also less likely to smoke because their higher learning ability leads them
1to better understand the negative eﬀects of smoking then it is possible that this unobserved
dimension of learning ability could be the culprit behind the observed negative correlation
between smoking and wage growth rates. Second, if individuals diﬀer in their rates of time
preference then those who discount the future more heavily will clearly weigh their current
wages (ﬁrst wage) relative to their future wages (wage growth) more heavily than those who
discount the future less.1 S i n c ed i s c o u n tr a t e sa r el i k e l yt oa ﬀect all forms of investments,
individuals with high discount rates will be less likely to make other investments, including
investing in their health. Hence the discounting hypothesis is that individuals with high
discount rates will be more likely to smoke and more likely to have ﬂatter wage proﬁles.2 In
sum, both hypotheses lead to the same prediction, namely, a negative correlation between
smoking and wage growth rates.
So the question is whether the source of the unexplained variation in wage dynamics
is due to unobserved learning ability or time preference. The objective of this paper is
to present a simple theory of wage dynamics an dd e r i v ead i s c r i m a t i n gt e s tt oe m p i r i c a l
assess the relative importance of these two potential sources of unobserved heterogeneity in
explaining the wage growth gap between smokers and non-smokers.
The discriminating test we propose in this paper is based on theoretical implications of
time preference versus learning ability on the trade-oﬀ between the ﬁr s tw a g ea n ds u b s e q u e n t
wage increases, two key parameters that describe individual careers. In particular, we show
that the correlation between the ﬁrst period wage and wage growth rate across smokers and
non-smokers diﬀer markedly under the two alternative hypotheses. To preview our modeling
results: First, holding learning ability constant, the ﬁr s tp e r i o dw a g ea n dw a g eg r o w t h
rate are negatively correlated because individual discount rates diﬀer (and are unobserved).
1Since individual discount rates are deﬁned in terms of current versus future consumption and not in
terms of current versus future incomes, we implicitly assume that workers face borrowing constraints against
returns on investments in human capital. It should be noted, however, that even if the capital market is
perfect, the returns on an investment in schooling, for example, depend on hours of work if schooling raises
market productivity by a larger percentage than it raises non-market productivity. Individuals who are more
future-oriented desire relatively more leisure at older ages. Therefore, they work more at younger ages and
have a higher discounted marginal beneﬁt on a given investment than persons who are more present oriented.
2The idea that smoking is a proxy for discount rates is extensively documented in the economics literature
(Fuchs, 1982). Empirical studies ﬁnd correlations between smoking and various other behaviors related to
future outcomes, including health status, educational attainment, earnings levels, use of seat belts, physical
exercise, and brushing and ﬂossing teeth (Hersch and Viscusi 1990; Hersch 1996; Levine et. al. 1997; Hersch
2000; Viscusi and Hersch 2001).
2More importantly, however, if smoking is correlated with individual discount rates then
this negative trade-oﬀ between the ﬁrst period wage and wage growth rate is larger among
smokers than among non-smokers. Second, if non-smokers are simply more eﬃcient learners
and the distribution of discount rates is similar across smokers and non-smokers, then the
observed negative trade-oﬀ will typically be smaller among smokers than among non-smokers.
As a consequence, the discounting and learning hypotheses predict a diﬀe r e n ts i g no nt h e
interaction term between smoking and the ﬁrst wage in a wage growth equation.
In our model of career choice individuals face a trade-oﬀ between the ﬁrst wage and
wage growth rate as depicted in Figure 1. The technology of on-the-job human capital
production is based on the following considerations. Increase in training time and eﬀort
(and the corresponding reductions in ﬁrst period wages) increases future productivity and
thus future wages. However, the ﬁxity of the human body and initial level of human capital
would clearly imply that this increase occurs at a diminishing rate. Hence, all else constant,
the production possibility frontier, or more speciﬁcally, the constraint function between the
ﬁrst period wage and wage growth rate will be concave to the origin. Thus the negative
slope of this constraint will decrease in absolute value — i.e. a decreasing marginal rate of
transformation — as more and more resources are diverted from current wages to training
that enhances future wages (and thus the wage growth rate). We use this relatively simple
two-period model of career choice to study the ramiﬁcations of the discounting and learning
hypotheses.
Under the discounting hypothesis, the key assumption of the model that generates the
negative interaction eﬀect between smoking and ﬁrst-period wages is diminishing returns to
training or learning — i.e. the fact, as mentioned above, that the constraint function between
the ﬁr s tp e r i o dw a g ea n dw a g eg r o w t hr a t ei sc o n c a v et ot h eo r i g i n .N o t et h a tf o rag i v e n
production constraint, the optimal choice point on this constraint will be determined by an
individual’s time preference. Put diﬀerently, heterogeneity of time preference will simply
trace this non-linear production constraint. The ﬁrst model implication is of course that
holding initial human capital constant, the ﬁrst period wage will be negatively correlated
with the wage growth rate. Moreover, low discount workers will locate in the ﬂatter region
of the constraint where the ratio of second period wage increase to ﬁrst period wages are
3relatively high, and high discount workers will locate in the steeper region of the constraint
where the ratio of second period wage growth to ﬁrst period wages is relatively lower. If
smokers have relatively higher discount rates than non-smokers then the observed negative
correlation between ﬁrst period wages and second period wage increases will be larger among
smokers than among non-smokers (holding initial level of human capital constant). These
details are graphically depicted in Figure 2.3
On the other hand, if the source of unobserved heterogeneity is diﬀerences in learning abil-
ity then workers with diﬀerent learning abilities will locate on diﬀerent production possibility
frontiers. Since we assume that all workers start their careers with the same level of human
capital, the production frontier of the more able workers will be higher — the same ﬁrst period
wage intercept but a higher second period wage increase intercept — and thus steeper than
the production frontier of their less able counterparts. Therefore, if non-smokers are more
able learners than their smoker counterparts then the observed negative correlation between
ﬁr s tp e r i o dw a g e sa n ds e c o n dp e r i o dw a g ei n c r e ases will be larger among non-smokers. The
key point is that the implications for the observed trade-oﬀ between the ﬁrst wage and wage
growth across smokers and non-smokers are reversed under the two alternative hypotheses.
In the empirical section of the paper we test whether the negative relationship between the
ﬁrst wage and wage growth rate is stronger among smokers or non-smokers. Our empirical
strategy is to ﬁrst delineate for each individual the two key variables: the wage at the time
of full time entry into the labor market (ﬁrst wage) and subsequent wage increases over the
working career (wage growth rate). The latter variable is based on a coeﬃcient estimate of
time in labor market by running a wage regression for each individual in our data sample.
We then implement wage growth regression models that include the ﬁrst wage, smoking,
and an interaction of ﬁrst wage and smoking as the three key explanatory variables. The
sign on this interaction term constitutes a discriminating test. To anticipate our empirical
ﬁndings: The estimated coeﬃcient of the interaction between smoking and ﬁr s tw a g ei s
negative and highly signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding is robust across various model speciﬁcations,
and lends support to the discounting hypothesis.
Before proceeding to the details of the paper a couple of caveats need to be addressed.
3The speciﬁc parameters in Figure 2 pertain to the modeling details in Section 2.
4First, our empirical test raises the question of whether we have properly identiﬁed smoking
as a proxy for individual discount rates. Since each individual in our sample contributes to
only one observation in our regression framework, the negative coeﬃcient of the interaction
term is based on a cross section of observations. The observed correlation between ﬁrst wage
and wage growth across smokers and non-smokers could in principle be due to other sources
of heterogeneity since we do not trace the same individual making choices about ﬁrst wage
and wage growth at diﬀerent points in time. However, given that each individual represents
a single career, this identiﬁcation problem is not simply a data issue, but rather arises from
a conceptual consideration that each individual represents one overall career observation.
Although we acknowledge that our discriminating test is not conclusive in the sense that the
trade-oﬀ between ﬁrst wages and wage growth is estimated via a cross section of individuals,
we hope that it is at least a ﬁrst step towards getting insight into the intractable issue of
what type of unobserved heterogeneity might be at the root of the wage growth gap between
smokers and non-smokers.
Second, although our model predicts a negative correlation between the ﬁr s tw a g ea n d
wage growth, evidence of such a negative correlation could indeed be spuriously generated if
the ﬁrst wage in measured with error. For example, if the ﬁrst wage is under reported then
our estimate of wage growth will be correspondingly higher and vice versa. We address this
potential problem by also using the average of the ﬁrst two observed wages as our measure
of ﬁrst wage. Our results are robust to this speciﬁcation.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. The next section presents a model of
wage dynamics and derives the discriminating test to address whether the observed corre-
lations between smoking and wage growth is due to time preference or learning ability. In
Section 3 we present the empirical analysis. We begin with a description of the NLSY data
and an outline of the estimation framework. We then present the ﬁndings from the wage
growth regressions and show that the estimated coeﬃcient of the interaction between smok-
ing and ﬁr s tw a g ei sn e g a t i v ea c r o s sv a r i o u sm o d e ls p e c i ﬁcations and wage growth metrics.
Section 4 concludes with a brief summary.
52 A Theory of Wage Dynamics
Non-smokers have substantially higher wage growth rates compared to their smoker coun-
terparts. Since it can be argued that smoking is a possible correlate of either individual
discount rates or low learning ability and because both the discount rate and learning ability
are unobserved determinants of wage growth, the observed disparity in wage growth rates
across non-smokers and smokers as mentioned earlier in the introduction is consistent with
two alternative hypotheses: smoking is a proxy for discount rates or smoking is a proxy
for learning ability. To resolve this identiﬁcation problem, we present a two period inter-
temporal model of wage dynamics where wages are determined by the interaction of the
individual discount rate and learning ability. O nt h eb a s i so ft h i sm o d e l ,w ed e r i v ead i s -
criminating test to address whether smoking is a proxy for discounting or learning ability.
The model follows the logic of Rosen (1974). In the ﬁr s t( i n v e s t m e n t )p e r i o dw o r k e r sc a n
sacriﬁce current wages in order to enhance their productivity (and thus wages) in the sec-
ond (post investment) period. With a few additional assumptions, individual preferences
(i.e. the discount rate) will then determine the optimal combination of current and future
wages along the production possibility frontier (which itself will be determined by training
eﬃciency). Hence wage dynamics are modeled as a function of individual discount rates and
training eﬃciency.
2.1 Model
Consider the wage possibilities of a worker who lives for two periods. If the worker makes
investments in human capital in the ﬁrst period, she will enhance her future productivity
at the expense of her current productivity. As a result, assume that the trade-oﬀsi np r o -
ductivity in the two periods can be summarized by the following production possibilities
curve:
∆W =
αγ
2
−
γ
2α
W
2. (1)
Assuming that workers are paid their productivity, interpret ∆W as the wage increase in
the second period and W as the ﬁrst period wages. In the absence of training, ﬁrst period
and second period wages are equal and given by α, and wage increase is equal to zero, i.e.,
6∆W =0 . Hence we interpret α as the wage potential corresponding to a ﬁxed, initial level
of human capital, and we assume throughout that it is the same across all workers.4 The γ
parameter is correlated with the rate of transformation of ﬁr s tw a g ei n t of u t u r ew a g ei n c r e a s e s
(∆W) by diverting resources from current production (thus decreasing W) into training that
enhances future productivity.5 Higher values of γ imply more eﬃcient training, and the
assumed functional form implies concavity of the production possibility curve to highlight
decreasing returns to training.6 We note once again that our discriminating test (derived
below) hinges on this extremely weak and uncontroversial assumption about diminishing
returns to training.
We now turn to worker preferences. Assume that workers face borrowing constraints, and
thus W and (W+∆W) mimic consumption in the ﬁrst period and second period, respectively.
Since the resource constraint given in (1) above is concave to the origin, we present analyses
with both linear and more standard non-linear Cobb-Douglas utility functions. First consider
the following linear utility function:
U = W + β∆W,( 2 )
where β is the time discount factor and hence higher values of β imply more future oriented-
ness.7
The ﬁrst-order condition for utility maximization implies that the slope of the production
possibilities curve (marginal rate of transformation of W for ∆W) equals the marginal rate
of substitution (MRS) of W for ∆W in consumption:
MRTW,∆W ≡
γ
α
W =
1
β
≡ MRSW,∆W.
Hence
W =
α
γβ
,( 3 )
4In the model we abstract from considering heterogeneity of initial levels of human capital. In the
empirical analysis we of course control for many observed dimensions of human capital. Our focus in this
t h e o r ys e c t i o ni so ni s o l a t i n gt h ee ﬀects of unobserved factors such as time preference and learning ability
on wage dynamics.
5This assumption is similar to Rosen’s (1972) idea that diﬀerent jobs are characterized by the diﬀerent
learning opportunities they oﬀer.
6Note that the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) is equal to
γ
αW. Clearly MRT is increasing in
γ; it is also increasing in W, which implies diminishing returns to training. Note, as training increases, W
decreases and so does the MRT.
7Note β =1 /(1 + r),w h e r er i st h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ef o rt h ep r e s e n t .
7and by substituting (3) into (1) we obtain
∆W =
αγ
2
−
α
2γβ
2.( 4 )
Thus (3) and (4) are the solutions to the constrained utility maximization problem in terms
of ﬁrst and second period wages, respectively. Solutions to diﬀerent discount rates are
graphically depicted in Figure 2.8 As can be seen from Figure 2, heterogeneity of discount
rates simply traces the constraint. The same analysis is shown in Figure 3 with the exception
that we now include a second constraint to distinguish between high ability and low ability
workers.
First note, since our focus is on wage growth, the partial derivatives of ∆W with respect
to β and γ are both positive:
∂∆W
∂β
=
α
γβ
3 > 0,a n d
∂∆W
∂γ
=
α
2
+
α
2γ2β
2 > 0.
These basic comparative static exercises imply that wage growth of non-smokers relative to
their smoker counterparts can be higher on account of either non-smokers having higher βs
on average or because non-smokers have higher γso na v e r a g e .T h u st h eﬁnding that wage
growth is higher among a sample of non-smokers than it is among a sample of smokers is
consistent with either hypothesis.9 So the question is whether this model of wage dynamics
can also generate a test to discriminate between the discounting hypothesis and learning
ability hypothesis.
2.2 Discounting or Learning Ability: A Discriminating Test
First consider the correlation between W and ∆W when β (time preference) diﬀers among
indviduals and is unobserved, and α (initial human capital) and γ (learning ability) are as-
sumed to be constant. Clearly, the observed W and ∆W simply trace the possibility frontier
8Modifying the utility function such that ∆W represents total second period consumption (instead of
just increases in second period consumption) will not alter any of the analytical results.
9The simple models depicted in Figures 2 and 3 imply that non-smokers will have lower ﬁrst period
wages, a prediction that is not supported by the data. Note, however, we have assumed that the initial
stock of human capital is the same across high and low discount workers and across high ability and low
ability workers, respectively. That is, we have assumed a constant α across all workers. If however low
discount workers (or high ability workers) have made greater pre-market investments then it is likely that
these workers may indeed have relatively higher stocks of unobserved skills (since our regression analysis
controls for various observed human capital characteristics). Hence if unobservable dimensions of α are
higher for low discount and high ability workers then it is indeed possible that they will on average also
experience higher levels of ﬁrst period wages as we see in the data.
8given by equation (1). Thus a regression of W on ∆W will imply a negative correlation
between wage growth and ﬁrst period wages.10 The question is whether this negative rela-
tionship is likely to diﬀer across smokers and non-smokers if smoking is a proxy for individual
discount rates. From Figure 2 the answer is obvious: the slope of the production possibility
frontier where smokers locate is relatively steeper. Thus the negative trade-oﬀ between ﬁrst
period wages and wage growth is larger for smokers than non-smokers. A slightly more
formal argument is presented below.
Suppose under the discounting hypothesis that smoking is a “limited” proxy for individual
time preference. For simplicity, assume that S∗ = λ/β,w h e r eS∗ denotes smoking propensity,
λ some constant, and β the time discount factor. However, we only observe whether an
individual smokes or not (hence the sense in which smoking is a “limited” proxy). Hence let
S =1if S∗ ≥ k and S =0otherwise. So S is the smoking indicator variable and k some
constant. For illustrative purposes suppose that β is uniformly distributed, i.e., β ∈ [0,1].
From the deﬁnition of S it implies that β
S ∈ [0,β
∗] and β
NS ∈ [β
∗,1],w h e r eβ
∗ = λ/k.
That is, smokers will have lower βs and non-smokers will have higher βs, respectively. Since
β determines both W and ∆W, smokers and non-smokers will locate on the bottom-right
region and top-left region, respectively, of the possibility frontier given by (1). Given the
concavity of (1) the negative relationship between W and ∆W will be lower in absolute terms
for a sample of non-smokers relative to a sample of smokers. Hence, under the hypothesis
that smoking is a proxy for discounting, the observed negative trade-oﬀ between ﬁrst period
wages and future wage increases will be relatively less for non-smokers. See the illustrative
thick solid and dashed lines in Figure 2 that identify the simple correlation between W and
∆W for non-smokers and smokers, respectively.
Now consider the case where smoking is a proxy for learning ability holding the distrib-
ution of discount rates among high ability and low ability workers identical. The objective
is to isolate any possible eﬀect of learning ability on the observed trade-oﬀ between ﬁrst
period wages and wage growth. Given that the overall slope of the production possibility
10The possible objection that W is endogenous and thus should not be included as a RHS variable in a
wage growth regression is somewhat artiﬁcial in the context of this model. Note that both W and ∆W are
a function of β from (3) and (4), respectively. However, since β is unobserved but W is observed, from (3)
it is obvious that W is an ideal proxy for β. Thus the inclusion of W in an wage growth regression could be
interpreted precisely as a proxy variable for unobserved β.
9frontier is steeper for the high learning ability workers than it is for the low ability workers,
F i g u r e3m i g h ts u g g e s tt h a tt h en e g a t i v et r a d e - o ﬀ should be relatively larger for high ability
workers. However, given our linear utility function the correct answer is that the observed
trade-oﬀ between ﬁrst period wage and wage growth is the same across high and low ability
workers. To see this more formally, note that the observed trade-oﬀ is the ratio of the change
in earnings growth to the change in ﬁrst period earnings, where both changes are due to a
change in β. At the limit this is nothing but the partial derivative of ∆W with respect to β
divided by the partial derivative of W with respect to β. Therefore at the limit the trade-oﬀ
between W and ∆W due to a small change in β is given by:
∂∆W/∂β
∂W/∂β
=
α/γβ
3
−α/γβ
2 = −
1
β
Hence the trade-oﬀ under the linear utility speciﬁcation is only a function of the discount
rate and not also of the training ability. Recall, that under the assumption that smoking
is a proxy for discounting, this negative trade-oﬀ will be larger for smokers (because they
are presumed to have lower βs) as we claimed earlier; but if smoking is a proxy for learning
ability, then there is no diﬀerence in the observed negative trade-oﬀ between ﬁrst period
wages and second period wage growth across smokers and non-smokers. This “no diﬀerence”
result is a consequence of the linear utility function, and as the next example illustrates, with
convex utility functions the observed negative trade-oﬀ is predicted to be larger among non-
smokers under the learning hypothesis. The point however is that under the two alternative
hypotheses the prediction in the diﬀerence in this trade-oﬀ b e t w e e ns m o k e r sa n dn o n - s m o k e r s
is reversed, implying that we have a discriminating test.
N e x tw ee x a m i n et h i ss a m et r a d e - o ﬀ using a more standard Cobb-Douglas utility speci-
ﬁcation. Consider the following utility function:
U = W∆W
β.( 5 )
Again β can be interpreted as the discount factor, where a higher value of β implies more
future oriented-ness. Of course this type of utility function is more realistic in the sense that
unlike linear utility functions, the trade-oﬀ an individual is willing to make between future
wage growth and current wages is now a function also of the ratio of future wage growth to
10current wages. The solutions to this constrained utility maximization problem are given by:
W =
α
√
2β +1
,( 6 )
and by substituting (6) into (1), we obtain
∆W =
αγβ
2β +1
.( 7 )
The trade-oﬀ between ﬁrst period wages and wage growth due to a change in β is given
by:
∂∆W/∂β
∂W/∂β
=
αγ/(2β +1 ) 2
−α/(2β +1 ) 3/2 = −
γ
√
2β +1
.
If we hold learning ability constant and assume that smoking is a proxy for discount rates
then the negative trade-oﬀ will clearly be stronger for smokers (lower β means a larger
negative value in the above expression). On the other hand, if smoking is a proxy for low
learning ability and the distribution of preferences is similar across high and low ability
workers, then the negative trade-oﬀ will be smaller for smokers (lower γ means a smaller
negative value in the above expression) than for non-smokers. Figures 4 and 5 present these
results in a graphic format under the assumption that smoking is a proxy for discounting
and low ability, respectively. In each diagram, the thick solid and dashed lines identify the
simple correlation between W and ∆W for non-smokers and smokers, respectively. Note
t h a tt h es l o p eo ft h en e g a t i v et h i c ks o l i dl i n ei sﬂatter than the slope of the thick dashed
line in Figure 4, and that this result is reversed in Figure 5.
Thus the sign of the coeﬃcient of an interaction term between smoking and ﬁrst period
wages (in a wage growth regression) constitutes as a discriminating test for whether smoking
is a proxy for discounting or whether it is a proxy for learning ability.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 NLSY Data
We use the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY) data from 1979 to 1994. The
data contain information about smoking behavior of the respondents in their late teens and
early twenties. The panel nature of the data and the fact that we observe the entire early
11work histories of the vast majority of our respondents allow us to directly correlate smoking
behavior with individual earnings over the ﬁrst decade or so of their careers. In addition,
the NLSY data contain rich information on a variety of individual, family, geographic and
work related characteristics. In the appendix we have a detailed description of the NLSY
data.
Our construction of individual wage growth rates exploits the panel nature of the NLSY
by running, for each individual in our sample, a simple OLS wage regression with time since
ﬁrst entering the labor market as the independent variable. We interpret the time coeﬃcient
as an estimate of the individual average wage growth rate and implement it as the dependent
variable in our wage growth analyses. In the individual OLS regressions we specify the wage
rate metric both as the real wage and as the log of real wage.11
It should be pointed out that although we use a longitudinal data set, eﬀectively we
only observe one career per person. This is a drawback because a complete identiﬁcation
of our model requires multiple observations per person. It is diﬃcult, however, to think of
a data set in which individuals are observed making more than one choice concerning their
“careers”, and thus making more than one choice of a wage proﬁle (i.e., initial wage as well
as wage growth rate).
3.2 Estimation Framework
In this section we implement the discriminating test suggested by the model, using the
NLSY data set. The test requires the inclusion of an interaction term between ﬁrst wage
and smoking in a wage growth regression (in addition to ﬁrst wage and smoking as separate
variables). Therefore, we estimate the following model:
∆Wi = Xiα + α1Si + α2Wi + α3SiWi + εi,
where ∆Wi is a measure of individual i’s wage growth, Xi is a vector of individual charac-
teristics, S is a smoking indicator, W is the individual’s ﬁrst wage, and εi is individual i’s
11Standard wage equations of course only use the log speciﬁcation. The reason for this practice is the
universal implementation of Mincer’s human capital earnings function. In the context of our paper, where
what matters is the perception of wage increases, it is not evident a priori which measure of wage growth is
more relevant. Therefore, we present evidence using both measures. In a previous version of the paper we
also used nominal wages and its log counterpart and duplicated the same qualitative results.
12error term. The estimated coeﬃcient of the parameter α3 will constitute the discriminating
test between the two sources of unobserved heterogeneity. Our prediction of course is that
∂∆Wi/∂W < 0, implying that α2 is negative. But the discriminating test is whether this
negative relation between the ﬁrst wage and wage growth is stronger for smokers or non-
smokers — i.e. whether the sign on α3 is negative or positive. Time preference implies that
it should be negative, and learning ability implies that it should be reversed and positive.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents smoking rates (reported in 1984) for a select group of occupations. In our
entire sample 38% were classiﬁed as smokers in 1984.12 The variation in this gross smoking
rate is quite dramatic with “Maids and Housemen” at the high end with a smoking rate of
62%, and “Teachers in Elementary Schools” at the low end with less than 10%. These rates
are comparable to estimates found in other studies.13
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics for smokers and non-smokers. These gross
mean characteristics are strikingly diﬀerent. For example, educational attainment is sub-
stantially higher for the sample of non-smokers.14 Non-smokers on average have over one
and a quarter more years of completed schooling, are much more likely to have a high school
diploma, and score about 10 points higher on the Armed Forces Qualifying Tests (AFQT).
The diﬀerences in labor market outcomes are even more dramatic. Non-smokers earn higher
wages, have more “net” labor market experience, and have lower turnover rates, than smok-
ers. Not surprisingly, a relatively smaller percent of non-smokers report health as a limiting
factor to the amount and kind of work they could do.15
12We deﬁne a smoker as someone who smokes at least one cigarette per day on average. This deﬁnition is
more or less comparable to the deﬁnition of “current smoker” used by the US Center for Disease Control (See
the data appendix for further details). Similar rates have been reported by others (Evans and Montromery
(1994), Levine, Gustafson and Velenchik (1997)).
13Although the detailed rankings of occupations by smoking has varied over the years (Nelson et.al. 1994),
they are broadly similar to ours, where blue collar workers are at the top, and white collar workers are at
the bottom, where teachers and sales representative have the lowest smoking rates (Bang and Kim, 2001)
14This is a well-documented ﬁnding (see Sander 1995).
15It is possible that individuals having health problems will select into jobs where their health problems
do not limit their work, thus resulting in an underestimation of health problems due to smoking. We hope
that the use of the word “could” in the survey instrument reduces such a problem. (See data appendix for
the exact wording of the survey instrument.) For additional evidence on the health limitations of smoking
13The gross hourly pay is substantially lower for smokers compared to non-smokers. On
average, the non-smoker wage premium is over 15%. The diﬀerences in ﬁr s tw a g ea n dw a g e
growth rates provide further insight into the overall wage disparity between smokers and
non-smokers. The mean ﬁrst wage is lower for smokers, but this diﬀerence (7%) is not as
substantial as the diﬀerence in overall wages. However, the substantial diﬀerence in the
increases in hourly wages (.34 versus .21) represents a huge wage growth premium of over
60% between smokers and non-smokers, and thus suggests that wage growth diﬀerentials are
largely responsible for the well-documented fact that smokers earn less than non-smokers.16
3.3.2 Regression Results
In Table 3 we report our ﬁndings from a variety of wage growth models. We present the
coeﬃcient estimates of smoking, ﬁrst wage, and interaction of smoking and ﬁrst wage, from
the ﬁrst to the third row of each panel, respectively. The columns from left to right include
diﬀerent control variables: in the ﬁrst column we do not include any additional variables, and
in the second and third columns we include the listed variables cumulatively. This same set
of regressions are duplicated across the three columns on the right side where we substitute
the average of the ﬁrst two observed wages for the ﬁrst wage. In panel I we use the ﬁrst real
wage and in panel II we use the log of ﬁrst real wage.
The estimated coeﬃcient of the interaction between smoking and ﬁrst wage (third row
of each panel) is negative and highly signiﬁcant across all speciﬁcations. In particular that
adding a host of control variables, including completed years of schooling and AFQT scores,17
only seems to strengthen this negative interaction eﬀect. This ﬁnding is of course consistent
with the time preference hypothesis and inconsistent with the learning hypothesis. Although
this conclusion is unsurprising given that the inclusion of AFQT scores (or the ten ASVAB
on the job see Leigh (1985 and 1986).
16If smoking is a proxy for discounting then our measure of wage growth may in fact underestimate the
“eﬀective” wage growth rate for non-smokers. Since non-smokers are more likely to have a College degree
and thus have considerably higher debt, their wages during the early part of careers will overstate their
disposable income. Hence the “eﬀective” wage growth diﬀerential between non-smokers and smokers is likely
to be even higher than what is suggested by our measured wage growth diﬀerences. Similar considerations
suggest that the “eﬀective” ﬁrst wage diﬀerences between non-smokers and smokers will be smaller than the
gross diﬀerences presented in Table 2. These considerations, however, are unlikely to lead to any ﬁrst order
bias of our regression coeﬃcients since we control for completed years of schooling.
17If we consider schooling time as part of the trade-oﬀ, the gap between smokers and non-smokers will be
much larger, given the lower levels of schooling among smokers.
14scores) failed to nullify the negative eﬀect of smoking on wage growth, the robustness of
the interaction eﬀe c ti ss t r o n ge v i d e n c ei ns u p p o r to ft h et i m ep r e f e r e n c eh y p o t h e s i s ,a n da
rejection of the hypothesis that an unobserved dimension of learning ability is the culprit
behind the observed correlation between smoking and wage dynamics.
We conclude this section with a few noteworthy comments related to some of the other
coeﬃcient estimates. First, the correlation between ﬁrst wage and wage growth is negative
as predicted by dynamic equilibrium models of compensation. Note that using the average
of the ﬁrst two wages as the ﬁr s tw a g eh a r d l yc h a n g e st h en e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient on the ﬁrst
wage and only slightly the coeﬃcient estimates on smoking and the interaction term. We
implement this speciﬁcation to address the concern that the negative coeﬃcient estimate
on ﬁrst wage may be due to measurement error of the ﬁr s tw a g e . S e c o n d ,t h ep o s i t i v e
coeﬃcient estimate of smoking should not be interpreted as a reversal of our earlier ﬁnding
of a negative correlation between smoking and wage growth. In the context of including an
interaction term between ﬁrst wage and smoking, the positive coeﬃcient on smoking simply
says that if the ﬁrst wage is zero then smokers are predicted to have a higher future wage
than their non-smoker counterparts. Of course this hypothetical exercise is out of sample
since we exclude all wage observations below a threshold of $2 (in 1987 dollars) from our
analysis. However, the broader implication of this result may be quite consistent with the
time preference hypothesis.
Av e r yl o wﬁrst wage is likely to yield greater dis-utility for the present-oriented (smokers)
than for the future-oriented (non-smokers), and thus the compensating future wage may in
fact be relatively higher for smokers than for non-smokers at very low levels of current wages.
None of these considerations, however, negate our key ﬁnding that an increase in ﬁrst wage
leads to a higher wage growth penalty for smokers compared to non-smokers.18
We attempt to summarize our key ﬁndings in the two diagrams given in Figures 6 and 7.
Figure 6 simply highlights the fact that smokers have lower and ﬂatter wage proﬁles based
on our analysis of the smoking “eﬀects” on ﬁrst wage and wage growth. In Figure 7 the
graph displays the negative interaction eﬀect of smoking and ﬁrst wage on wage growth.
18Of course in our data we do not observe individuals actually making these trade-oﬀs between ﬁrst wage
and wage growth since each individual represents a single data point in all our regressions. Hence our
conclusions are clearly based on cross sectional evidence.
15T h eY - a x i si sw a g eg r o w t ha n dt h eX - a x i si sﬁr s tw a g e . T h en e g a t i v er e l a t i o n s h i ps h o w s
the predicted trade-oﬀ between ﬁrst wage and wage growth. The negative interaction term
is illustrated by the fact that this negative relationship is steeper for smokers than it is for
non-smokers. Note that the Y-intercept is higher for smokers than non-smokers (as implied
by the positive smoking coeﬃcient), but the two lines intersect at a relatively low ﬁrst wage
of approximately $4.50. We also summarize in Figure 7 our earlier ﬁndings depicted in
Figure 6 — both, lower average ﬁrst wage and lower average wage growth among smokers
— to illustrate the consistency of our separate analyses. It is clear from Figure 7 that our
earlier ﬁndings are entirely compatible with either a steeper or ﬂatter negative relationship
between ﬁrst wage and wage growth among smokers.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Much of the variation in wages across individuals remains unexplained despite the inclusion
of a host of observed variables. This unexplained variation in wages is due either to the lack of
data or to the fact that some relevant individual characteristics are inherently unobservable.
The question we address in this paper is simple but challenging: Is it possible to say whether
unexplained wage growth diﬀerentials across individuals is due to one type of unobserved
heterogeneity or another? We consider time preference (discounting) and learning ability
as two possible sources of unobserved heterogeneity that could in principle explain wage
growth diﬀerences, and develop a test to address whether wage growth diﬀerentials are due
to time preference or unobserved learning ability. In particular, we argue on the basis of
evidence from our discriminating test that the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in wage growth rates
between smokers and non-smokers are due (unobserved) diﬀerences in the mean discount
rate between smokers and non-smokers.
Our ﬁndings raise the possibility that a variety of psychological and personality traits are
likely to be more important than simple cognitive ability to process information in explaining
diﬀerences in labor market outcomes across individuals. As a consequence research endeavors
related to the various dimensions and interactions of what we refer to in economic parlance
as the “individual discount rate,” are likely to provide insights not only to our understanding
of career choice, investment in human capital, and wage determination, but more broadly to
16our understanding of the distribution of wealth, health, and happiness.
175 Data Appendix: National Longitudinal Surveys of
Youth, 1979-94
Our data is from the NLSY. This is a panel of 12,686 youth, aged 14-21 in 1978, and sampled
continuously since 1979. Our sample includes data up to 1994. We include individuals in our
sample when they ﬁrst report that their “main activity” is “working.” Therefore, our “First
Wage” variable is recorded accordingly. A key variable of our analysis is whether, in 1984,
respondents answered aﬃrmatively to whether they smoked or not. We classify a smoker
(in 1984) as a person who at least smoked one cigarette per day on average. Out of 12,584
who responded, 38.8% were classiﬁed as smokers. Similar, but not exact, questions were
also asked in 1992. A smoker was classiﬁed as someone who “smokes daily” (as opposed to
“occasionally” or “not at all”). Of the 8,341 who responded in 1992, 28.92% were classiﬁed
as smokers. We utilized only the 1984 smoking questions for the following reasons: By
1992 the number of individuals that answered the smoking survey dropped dramatically due
to sample attrition. Only 7,822 individuals answered the 1992 survey and had valid wage
growth measures. More important, the sample attrition was not random. Individuals who
smoked in 1984 were more likely to drop out, and even worse, those with lower wage growth
were substantially more likely to drop out.
Our principal dependent variable is a wage growth measure for each individual con-
structed over the ﬁrst several years in the labor market. We construct a wage growth
coeﬃcient for each individual by estimating a wage regression as a function of time only.
This estimated coeﬃcient is our measure of individual wage growth rates. For wages we use
two measures of hourly payments, real wages (in 1987 dollars) and their natural logarithm.
In an earlier version of the paper we also used nominal wages. Since none of our results was
aﬀected by the use of nominal wages, we limit the analysis here to real wages. We consider
wage reports to be valid only if nominal pay is between $2 and $200. Given the construction
of our wage growth measure, a minimum of two valid observations per individual is required
in order to be included in the sample.
Below we discuss the construction of several key variables used in the regressions.
Health. Respondents in the NLSY were asked, in each survey, the following two questions:
18(1) “hltamt” - whether health limited the amount of work you could do since last survey
(“(are you/would you be) limited in the kind of work you (could) do on a job for pay because
of your health?”), and (2) “hltknd” - whether health limited the kind of work you could do
since last survey (“(are you/would you be) limited in the amount of work you (could) do
because of your health?”). Using the answer to these two questions we constructed several
other additional health measures: (1) “evera” - if a person ever reported hltamt=1; (2)
“everk” - if a person ever reported hltknd=1; (3) “mhlta” - % of times reported hltamt=1;
and (4) “mhltk” - % of times reported hltknd=1. We experimented with all these measures
but report the regression results using “mhltk” only. None of the results was aﬀected by
using any of the other alternative measures of health.
Schooling. We use the respondents report on “highest grade completed” to construct six
schooling dummies: 8 years or less, 9-11 years, 12 years, 12-15 years, 16 years, and 17+ years.
We report only the results using the dummy variables. Replacing the schooling dummies
with the continuous measure didn’t aﬀect our results.
AFQT Scores. During the summer and fall of 1980, NLSY79 respondents participated
in an eﬀort of the U.S. Departments of Defense and Military Services to update the norms
of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The Department of Defense
and Congress, after questioning the appropriateness of using the World War II reference
population as the primary basis for interpreting the enlistment test scores of contemporary
recruits, decided in 1979 to conduct this new study. NLSY79 respondents were selected since
they comprised a pre-existing nationally representative sample of young people born during
the period 1957 through 1964. This testing, which came to be referred to as the “Proﬁle
of American Youth,” was conducted by NORC (National Organization for Research at the
University of Chicago) representatives according to standard ASVAB procedure guidelines;
respondents were paid $50 for their participation. Groups of ﬁve to ten persons were tested
at more than 400 test sites, including hotels, community centers, and libraries throughout
the United States and abroad. A total of 11,914 civilian and military NLSY79 respondents
(or 94 percent of the 1979 sample) completed this test: 5,766 or 94.4 percent of the cross-
sectional sample, 4,990 or 94.2 percent of the supplemental sample, and 1,158 or 90.5 percent
of the military sample.
19The ASVAB consists of a battery of 10 tests that measure knowledge and skill in the
following areas: (1) general science; (2) arithmetic reasoning; (3) word knowledge; (4) para-
graph comprehension; (5) numerical operations; (6) coding speed; (7) auto and shop in-
formation; (8) mathematics knowledge; (9) mechanical comprehension; and (10) electronics
information. A composite score derived from select sections of the battery can be used to
construct an approximate and unoﬃcial Armed Forces Qualiﬁcations Test score (AFQT)
for each youth. The AFQT is a general measure of trainability and a primary criterion
of enlistment eligibility for the Armed Forces. The creation of this percentile score, called
AFQT89, involves: (1) computing a verbal composite score by summing word knowledge
and paragraph comprehension raw scores; (2) converting subtest raw scores for verbal, math
knowledge, and arithmetic reasoning; (3) multiplying the verbal standard score by two; (4)
summing the standard scores for verbal, math knowledge, and arithmetic reasoning; and (5)
converting the summed standard score to a percentile.
Religion. We use two indicators for religious aﬃliation and frequency of attending reli-
gious services: (1) dummy variables indicating whether the person was raised Protestant,
Baptist, Episcopalian, Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic, or Jewish. (2)
The frequency in which respondents attended religious services (never, several times a year,
about once a month, three times a month, about once a week, or more than once a week). In
the regressions’ results reported in the paper we include both measures: religious aﬃliation
and frequency of attendance.
Neighborhood Income. This variable was constructed using the 1980 census of population
and later matched to the NLSY sample. It was calculated to describe the expected value
of a person’s neighborhood per capita income, given their race (white, black, or Hispanic),
education level (less than 8 years, 9-11 years, 12-15 years, or 16+ years), and the county
they live in, using data from the 1980 Census. Neighborhoods are deﬁned as block groups
in the 1980 Census, so each block group’s per capita income was calculated by dividing
aggregate household income for the block group by the total number of persons living in
that block group. (Both of these were variables given to us by the census.) Since the 1980
Census does not include Hispanic as one of their race categories, but rather as an ethnic
category separate of race (Hispanic persons were placed into one of ﬁve race categories:
20white, black, Asian, Native American or other.), we needed to approximate the number of
Hispanics, non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks living in each block group. We
did this by generating a beta for each race, which would represent the percent of Hispanic
persons that are of that race, and multiplying it by the number of Hispanic persons living
in the block group. This would approximate the number of Hispanic persons that were
recorded as belonging to each race, so that these categories could be amended. (This process
was done for each block group and for each education level. It was repeated several times,
replacing the betas, for precision.) The outcomes of this process were numbers for Hispanic,
non-Hispanic white, and non-Hispanic black persons in each education level for each block
group. “Neighborhood Income” was then found by creating the expected value of a person
of race X and education level Y for each county.
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23Table 1: Smoking Rates by Select Occupations
NLSY 1984
Occupation Smoking Rate Observations
All .376 9,501
Maids and Housemen .621 66
Roofers .600 40
Kitchen Workers .566 53
Waiters .554 233
Heavy Truck Drivers .509 106
Laborers and Construction .476 504
Carpenters .451 82
Janitors and Cleaners .413 305
Housekeepers and Butlers .386 171
Truck Drivers (light) .365 126
Teachers (n.e.c.) .349 43
Cashiers .348 391
Sales Workers, other Commodities .325 351
Secretaries .283 297
Athletes .226 31
Computer Programmers .208 101
Teachers, Elementary Schools .094 53
Note: Occupations are randomly selected across the spectrum of smoking rates with
the exception that we omit occupations with very low sample sizes.
24Table 2: Descriptive Statistics across Smokers and Non-smokers
NLSY 1979-1994
Non-Smokers Smokers
Variables
Age (in 1984) 23.49 23.66
Non White .43 .37
Sex (% males) .49 .54
Married/with Spouse .438 .376
Schooling 13.3 11.9
High School Diploma .86 .66
AFQT (1989) 45.3 34.7
Father Schooling 9.7 9.1
Mother Schooling 10.4 9.9
Health limit type of work .035 .045
Net years of experience (in 1994)* 11.5 10.4
Potential years of experience (in 1994)* 14.1 15.8
Hourly (nominal) pay (79-94) 13.29 11.54
Changed employer since last interview (79-94) .354 .431
Quit Job (79-94) .245 .288
Was Laid-oﬀ (79-94) .068 .086
Was ﬁred (79-94) .016 .031
First wage (real) 5.91 5.55
First wage (nominal) 4.77 4.36
Increase in hourly wage (nominal) .67 .49
Increase in hourly wage (1987 dollars) .34 .21
* “Net” refers to actual years of experience, while “potential” experience is calculated
as (age-schooling-6).
Note: Number of observation varies across variables. For ﬁxed individual characteristics
the number is about 6700, and for means taken over the whole 79-94 period, the number
is about 50,000 valid observations.All mean diﬀerences are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero, using 99% conﬁdence level (the t-test was performed assuming equal variance).
25Table 3: Wage Growth Regressions
OLS Speciﬁcation including Interaction between First Wage(s) and Smoking
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Using ﬁrst observed wage Using mean of ﬁrst two wages1
as First Wage as First Wage
No Limited Full No Limited Full
Controls Controls2 Controls3 Controls Controls Controls
Panel I
Smoking (S) 0.279 0.425 0.429 .092 .283 .298
(.039) (.038) (.038) (.043) (.043) (.042)
First real wage -.0.045 -0.052 -0.052 -.050 -.057 -.057
(FRW) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
SxFRW -0.077 -0.085 -0.086 -.042 -.058 -.061
(.006) (.005) (.006) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Panel II
Smoking 0.186 0.188 0.144 .269 .273 .279
(S) (.086) (.083) (.099) (.094) (.091) (.091)
ln of FRW -0.372 -0.590 -0.608 -.373 -.589 -.605
(FLRW) (.030) (.030) (.030) (.031) (.031) (.031)
SxFLRW -0.204 -0.141 -0.151 -.253 -.193 -.201
(.051) (.049) (.050) (.056) (.054) (.054)
1. Mean of ﬁrst wage observation and wage observation in next survey year. See Data
Appendix for more details.
2. Limited Controls include age, race, sex, schooling, and AFQT scores.
3. Full Controls include in addition to the above also health status, average per cap-
ital neighborhood income, religion aﬃliation, and frequency of attendance of religious
services. See the Data Appendix for a more detailed description of all variables.
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Discounting Hypothesis 
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Learning Hypothesis 
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Wage Profiles across Smokers and Non-smokers 
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